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The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev plan to build 
an innovation-based economy in Russia. The study has established a logical chain ‘inno-
vation-based growth – entrepreneurship – innovations – business environment’. This per-
spective helped to reveal the foundation for an innovation-based economy – a favorable 
business environment. It is argued that without a sophisticated business climate, there 
cannot be successful entrepreneurship and innovations and hence no innovation-based 
economy. 
 
Thus the thesis evaluates three reports that assess Russia’s business environment. These 
are the Doing Business Report (2013), the Global Competitiveness Report (2013) and a 
Russian Business Climate report compiled by the Russian Union of Industrialists and En-
trepreneurs (2014). Regardless of different methodological approaches, all three reports 
unanimously assert that the business climate in Russia is extremely unfavorable for entre-
preneurial and business activities. Russia scored towards the end of the list for the majority 
of indicators. 
 
Russia’s poor performance can be explained by several primary factors. First, Russia has 
undergone a traumatic transformation from a command economy to an economy based on 
free market principles. Second, it is a relatively young state with no collective memory in 
the society of living under the free market economy. Third, Russia inherited from the Soviet 
Union a highly misbalanced economy oriented on state procurement and military orders. 
 
The thesis concludes that creating an innovation-based economy in Russia in the nearest 
future is highly unlikely, particularly due to the unfavorable business environment and un-
sustainable economic model. The two will always act as impediments for entrepreneurial 
activities and innovations, and consequently for building an innovative economy. Finally, 
the thesis suggests to a strategy of first developing a favorable business climate, which will 
naturally boost and attract entrepreneurial activity.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
On November 5th, 2008 Russia’s newly elected President Dmitry Medvedev in his first 
address to the Federal Assembly announced the four principles of the country’s future 
economic development. These principles became known as four ‘I’s: institutions, in-
vestment, infrastructure and innovation (Medvedev, 2008). Improvement in the first 
three ‘I’s – institutions, investment and infrastructure, according to Medvedev, would 
pave the way and create a favorable environment for building an innovation-based 
economy in Russia. It was declared that from now on Russia’s priority would be crea-
tion (and in perspective export) of knowledge, advanced technologies and progressive 
culture (ibid.). At a later stage these four principles became a foundation for the so-
called ‘Strategy-2020’ a second edition of the Russian long-term socio-economic devel-
opment strategy that concentrated on building an innovation-led economy in Russia, 
and was released in 2013. 
 
Strategy-2020 is based on two foundations – a new economic growth model and new 
social politics. A new growth model is necessary, because the old model, based on fast 
growth of domestic demand and high prices on Russian primary export goods, has 
exhausted its potential (Mau, Rogov and Yasin, 2013). Accordingly, without the new 
growth model and more sustainable sources of income, there cannot be new social 
politics: the Russian economy would have to grow at least 5% a year to realize this 
new social program. At the same time, growth should not be based only on income 
from raw material exports and further state controlled reallocation of resources from 
commodity industries to industries with low productivity but high rates of employment 
such as healthcare and education (ibid.). 
 
One of the main ideas of the Long-term Development Strategy is a maneuver, which 
will allow to activate competitive advantages that have not been used previously – rel-
atively high quality of human capital and scientific research potential. Hence, new so-
cial politics should consider the interests of the citizens, who will be realizing the po-
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tential of innovative development and not only of those, who depend on social security 
(Mau, Rogov and Yasin, 2013). 
 
In a nutshell, the strategy is built around the idea that the economy of the future will 
be postindustrial and at the heart of it will be service industries, oriented on develop-
ment of human capital such as education, healthcare, information technologies, media 
and design. In some of these areas Russia has relative competitive advantages, but 
they are rapidly decreasing, due to underfunding and ineffective administration.  
 
The attempt to create an innovation-based economy in Russia represents a worthy 
aspiration on behalf of former president Medvedev. However, as is often the case with 
political statements and even with well-elaborated economic programs, they tend to be 
detached from reality. Therefore this thesis aims at assessing whether the aspirations 
to create an innovation-based economy in Russia are based on solid assumptions or 
merely constitute wishful thinking. In other words, could the Russian socio-economic 
situation as of 2013 realistically encourage a positive change towards an innovation-
based economic model? The following sub-chapter will briefly explain how the thesis 
aims to answer this question. 
 
1.2 Overview 
 
This thesis aims to first identify in chapter 2 what is economic growth and what are the 
primary sources of economic growth in a market economy. It will be established that 
the greatest increases in economic growth occurred due to innovation in technology 
and managerial techniques. Further, economic growth and innovation will be discussed 
briefly in light of Joseph Schumpeter’s economic paradigm, which sees economic 
growth as a product of knowledge, entrepreneurship and innovation. This is contrary to 
the neo-classical view of economic growth, which emphasizes that economic growth 
occurs due to price-based competition among firms, whose primary goal is to make 
profit. 
 
It can be said that there is a degree of similarity between Schumpeter’s ideas and the 
four principles of economic development proposed by Medvedev. Hence if one follows 
Schumpeterian logic, economic growth occurs when entrepreneurs create something 
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new through innovation. Additionally, the chapter concludes that the chain ‘economic 
growth – entrepreneurship – innovation’ would not be possible without a basic favora-
ble business environment, since the processes do not happen in a vacuum and are 
predominantly shaped by the wider business environment. 
 
In light of the identified importance of a positive business environment for innovation-
based growth, chapter 3 will be looking into the issues of the Russian business envi-
ronment. Firstly, it will be established that Russia is a relatively young market econo-
my, which inherited a very complex socio-economic structure from the Soviet Union. 
The inherited structure represents a massive barrier to creating a better business envi-
ronment in Russia in the first place. 
 
Secondly, the chapter will be assessing the Russian business environment according to 
the Doing Business Report compiled by the World Bank Group and the Global Competi-
tiveness Report created by the World Economic Forum. Their assessments will be com-
plimented by the yearly surveys evaluating the quality of the Russian business envi-
ronment compiled by the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists. Most sta-
tistical data provided in the thesis covers the period of 2012-2013 in order to avoid the 
extreme figures of 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. Also, sanctions distorted the statistics of 
2014-2015. 
 
Finally, the thesis will conclude by evaluating different parts of the Russian socio-
economic structure. This analysis will help to identify areas that require particular at-
tention in order to build a sustainable economy with a favorable business climate in 
Russia. In light of the established definition of innovation-based economy and unfavor-
able business environment in Russia, it will be argued that creating an innovation-led 
economy in the nearest future in Russia is deemed extremely unlikely. 
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2 Identifying the sources of an innovation-based economy 
 
The goal of this chapter, as mentioned previously, is merely to clarify some of the the-
oretical concepts such as growth, entrepreneurship and innovation. Understanding the 
basic nature of growth and innovation this chapter will show the importance of the 
socio-economic environment, which per se defines the success of building an innova-
tion-based economy.  
 
2.1 Technological change as primary source of economic growth 
 
Economists often present growth as an increase in the level of income of a country 
(Holcombe, 2007: 1). Whereas a country’s income is usually measured by totaling up 
the value added by each firm in the economy which gives a figure for the gross domes-
tic product (GDP), that is, the value of all the output produced by factors of production 
in the national economy (Dawson, at al., 2006: 23). Hence, “economic growth occurs 
when the market value of goods and services in an economy increases in one period 
compared to another, when adjusted for inflation” (Investopedia, n.d.). 
 
There is a wide consensus (leaving the distributional arguments aside) that high levels 
of GDP and growth in GDP are desirable. Since countries with higher levels of GDP 
usually have better opportunities to invest in infrastructure, education and healthcare, 
more people would have jobs and more money to spend, and to boost economic activi-
ties in the country (Begg and Ward, 2009: 232). 
 
However, classical income-oriented definitions of growth do not tell much about attain-
ing an innovation-based economic growth. The most one could derive from the given 
definitions is to look at the percentage share of innovative goods and service in the 
GDP of a country. Thus it is useful to assess sources that create and affect economic 
growth.  
 
For example, changes in demographics can affect economic growth. Decrease in popu-
lation means that there are fewer consumers to buy products and services. It also 
means that there are fewer people to produce the goods and services. Changes in the 
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age and gender of people in the workforce can also affect economic growth as prefer-
ences and tastes of consumers change, creating new opportunities in the market (In-
vestopedia, n.d.).  
 
Another factor influencing growth is productivity increases. This factor creates econom-
ic growth by making products and services more affordable and when products and 
services are more affordable, demand for them goes up. Hence economic activity in-
creases as more consumers purchase more goods and services (Investopedia, n.d.). Of 
course, here it is important to mention that the cheap products should meet other con-
sumer criteria such as reasonable quality, convenient placement, and attractive promo-
tion. There are many other factors that can influence economic growth, including the 
availability of cheap credit, high growth rates in neighboring countries, or low prices for 
energy resources (Dawson, at al., 2006a, 450; 2006b, 538). 
 
However, throughout history, changes in technology have generated the greatest in-
creases in economic growth. For example, according to Investopedia (n.d.), “the indus-
trial revolution created one of the greatest economic growth periods in history, during 
which machines replaced humans and animals as the means of production and trans-
portation became faster and less expensive”. This allowed for even greater expansion 
of economic activities within and among countries (Dawson, at al., 2006: 21; Hol-
combe, 2007: 11). 
 
Technological change can also take place in management techniques, making workers 
more organized and motivated, and thus more productive. Throughout the twentieth 
century, several schools of management were developed. It began with the Scientific 
School of Management established by Frederick Winslow Taylor, which concentrated 
on optimizing and simplifying tasks as much as possible so that workers could be 
taught to perform their jobs most efficiently and almost without thinking (NetMBA, 
2010). In this kind of managerial approach humans were used essentially to perform 
monotonous and similar tasks on a daily basis, similar to machines. Although such 
practices often led to workers acquiring a repetitive strain injury, the Scientific School 
of Management was a breakthrough idea that productivity increase can be achieved 
not only through improvement of machinery, but also through a scientific approach to 
managing the workforce (ibid.). 
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Thus technological change in management techniques or machinery allows countries to 
produce goods and services of better quality, faster and cheaper, boosting the eco-
nomic activity both domestically and across borders. So the long-term technological 
change or technological dynamism is what to a large degree determines the economic 
competitiveness of a country. In fact, there is a whole school of innovation economics 
associated with Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter.  
 
In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter (1996) argued that the 
primary drivers of economic growth in a capitalist economy are entrepreneurship and 
innovation. He claimed that both entrepreneurship and innovations are “… incessantly 
revolutionizing the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one 
[structure], incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is 
the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 1996: 83). In other words, continu-
ous improvement and adaptation in the production process are the sources of growth. 
 
Schumpeterian ideas are steering the focus away from income-oriented growth theory 
where the primary role plays the accumulation of productive factors – capital and la-
bor, to an innovation / technology-led growth. Therefore, the objective of an economic 
policy, according to Schumpeter’s followers, is to foster higher productivity through 
greater innovation. For that purpose, particular attention should be dedicated to crea-
tion and accumulation of knowledge as the primary ingredient for achieving an innova-
tion-based growth. So, policies stimulating both private and state R&D expenditures 
should be promoted, in anticipation of technological spillovers throughout the economy 
(Ahlstrom, 2010, ch. 1). 
 
This all sounds extremely similar to the ideas that Medvedev expressed in the begin-
ning of his first presidential term, which became the foundation for Russia’s long-term 
development strategy. Mr. Medvedev, according to open source, referred directly to 
Schumpeter only once in 2014, so it is difficult to assert for certain that he is a propo-
nent of Schumpeterian ideas. However, the idea that Russia should rely on and devel-
op an economy of knowledge in order to create a more sustainable growth model is 
certainly compatible with Joseph Schumpeter’s views on economic development. 
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As a recap, one could say that this chapter identifies technological change in produc-
tion and management techniques as factors generating the greatest sustainable in-
crease in economic growth. These changes are primarily achieved by means of entre-
preneurship and innovation. Thus, the next sub-chapter aims at conceptualizing these 
two sources of technological change. Additionally, some initial conditions required for 
the existence of entrepreneurship and innovation will be assessed.  
 
2.2 Defining entrepreneurship and innovation 
 
There are countless definitions of entrepreneurship, yet there is no common definition 
that would suit everyone. Therefore, assessing several definitions can be useful to ac-
tually grasp different shades of this economic activity. First to coin the term “entrepre-
neur” around 1800 was French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (Drucker, 1993: 21). Ac-
cording to him, the entrepreneur is the one who “shifts economic resources out of an 
area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield” (Say, 1800 cit-
ed in Drucker, 1993: 21). 
 
However, this definition does not say much about entrepreneurs and in fact creates 
some degree of confusion. Is it not so that every business allocates resources in a way 
that allows it to achieve higher productivity and greater yield? Therefore, can any busi-
nessman or businesswoman be considered an entrepreneur? For example, a family 
buys a franchising license to open a Subway fast-food restaurant that offers fresh 
sandwiches and is oriented on people, who are concerned about eating healthy. They 
surely take risk by starting their own business and surely the entire family does best 
when their business is productive and generates greater yields. Nevertheless, this type 
of business activity cannot be considered as entrepreneurial even though there is a 
widespread belief that anyone, who starts own business, is an entrepreneur. 
 
At the same time, Dr. Fred DeLuca and Dr. Peter Buck, who came up with the fast-
food concept that allowed consumers to get fresh and made-to-order sandwiches 
known under the brand of Subway are certainly entrepreneurs. The two doctors did 
not invent the fast-food industry; they basically produced sandwiches and there was 
nothing new about that. However, by reorganizing the process of serving sandwiches 
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and augmenting the product (i.e. keeping sandwiches always fresh and made-to-
order), Subway was able to create a new market and new customers. This is entrepre-
neurship.  
 
So the main difference between an entrepreneur and a businessman or even manager 
comes down to an entrepreneur’s ability to create something new via a product or an 
organizational change. This difference is summarized in Schumpeter’s (1965 as quoted 
in Eroglu, 2011) definition of entrepreneurs “as individuals who exploit market oppor-
tunity through technical and/or organizational innovation.”  
 
Renowned management guru Peter Drucker expressed a very similar perspective on 
entrepreneurship. In his book Entrepreneurship and Innovation (1993: 28), Drucker 
argued that entrepreneurship is “about taking risk,” whereas the entrepreneur “always 
searches for change, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity.” Moreover, 
Drucker (1993: 37) believed that continuous disruption of an economy by the new 
products and new organizational techniques is absolutely healthy and more effective 
than simple optimization of resources. In fact, it is a central principle of economic theo-
ry and economic practice. 
 
Entrepreneurs use a specific tool called innovation, “the means by which they exploit 
change as an opportunity for a different business of a different service. It is the act 
that endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth” (Drucker, 1993: 30). 
 
Here are some examples of entrepreneurship changing the economy by destroying the 
old ways of running business while creating the new ones. 
 
• Internet telephony and Skype are completely different concepts from old-
fashioned landline telephony, requiring a different business model and more 
advanced technologies. This innovation created a technological spillover into 
other industries making their daily business communications cheaper and more 
efficient. 
 
• Another Internet based innovation is transformation of physical points of sale 
into virtual. Today one can buy insurance, a car, or book a holiday trip online. 
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These changes created a whole new industry of e-commerce, which requires 
knowledge and understanding of e-marketing and sophisticated tools for its re-
alization. 
 
• The furniture store Ikea has created a high-volume business model for selling 
affordable furnishings. Their concept is very different from traditional furniture 
stores — low prices, great design, smooth operation of stores, and a better cus-
tomer experience all in one package. 
 
According to Gary Hamel (2000: 15), these industry revolutions revolve not simply 
around products and services, but around new business concepts. In essence, old 
business concepts are blown up while new ones are created; this change is radical and 
systematic as in the case of the creation of the World Wide Web, which brought signif-
icant change to all other industries.  
 
Thus, returning to the innovation-based economy, one could say that it is a type of 
economy whose primary factors of growth are entrepreneurship and innovation. Inno-
vation can result from intellectual, creative and developmental activities of people. 
Hereof, an innovation-based economy is an economy, which specializes in creation of 
goods and services that require a higher share of advanced technology and managerial 
know-how for their production. In order to make this growth sustainable, economic 
policy should aim to foster systematic innovation. Peter Drucker (1993: 35) defines 
systematic innovation as “a purposeful and organized search for changes, and in the 
systematic analysis of the opportunities such changes might offer for economic or so-
cial innovation.” 
 
However, innovativeness of an economy is by itself a dependent variable. Behind any 
innovation-based economy stands a complex system of socio-economic relations. The-
se socio-economic relations create an environment that influences entrepreneurial and 
innovative potentials in either a positive or negative way. Thus the last variable in the 
chain – growth, entrepreneurship, and innovation is the actual environment within 
which the innovation-based growth is expected. In fact, this variable is so important 
that, without basic favorable conditions within a country for entrepreneurship, innova-
tion and innovation-based growth are destined for failure. The following sub-chapter 
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aims to give a brief overview of business and economic environment in light of the 
already discussed concept of innovation-based growth. 
 
2.3 Conceptualizing business environment 
 
As established in the previous sub-chapters, every entrepreneur is a businessman or a 
businesswoman, but not every businessman or businesswoman is necessarily an en-
trepreneur. However, entrepreneurial business and business that relies on already ex-
isting technology can be both gathered under the term organization. At the same time, 
entrepreneurial skills can be learned and there is nothing stopping a conventional busi-
ness from becoming an entrepreneurial one (Drucker, 1993: 26). Therefore for the 
sake of simplicity from now on these two concepts can be used interchangeably unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
Any organization, be it for profit or non-profit, necessarily operates within two envi-
ronments.  First, is internal and it is distinctive within each particular organization and 
second, the broader external environment that is shared by all the other organizations 
and shareholders (Cartwright, 2001: 23). And, while the internal environment of an 
organization might have little impact on economy as a whole, the external environment 
has a tremendous effect on how the economy works. In fact, the economy is defined 
by the quality of the external environment within which organizations operate.  
 
Such factors as social, political, and economic stability, cultural and technological de-
velopment, legal, and environmental practices are all part of the external environment 
and all in one way or another shape business practices in a country (Cartwright, 2001: 
38). All of these factors are tightly intertwined and in different ways influence the fa-
vorability of a business environment. Drawing an analogy between nurturing any busi-
ness idea and cultivating crops here can be useful. Even the most advanced sorts of 
seeds will not yield harvest without a basic favorable environment with fertile soil, suf-
ficient irrigation, and moderate climate. 
 
Likewise in business if investment in certain industries is not profitable, no one will 
invest in such industries. And if one decides to invest in an unprofitable industry, he or 
she will most likely incur losses at least in the short- and mid-term, taking a huge risk. 
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At the same time if there is no cheap and transparent crediting system within the 
economy, businesses will not have sufficient funds to invest in development, not to 
mention settle day-to-day payments. Finally, if the business climate is not favorable for 
long-term investment and companies have to undergo infinite bureaucratic procedures 
or in the worst case an organized criminal group can overtake their business, no one in 
his or her right mind will invest in such an environment. 
 
Each of the factors of the external environment consists of various institutional ar-
rangements, business practices and cultural perceptions that affect people and organi-
zations within the country. For example, in relation to political environment in a coun-
try, companies can be concerned with the issue of transparency of government poli-
cymaking. Some governments are more likely to act in favor of certain industries than 
other governments. Biased decision-making can influence some industries negatively 
while others positively. Sometimes government protection of industries that constitute 
main source of income for the country is deemed to be necessary, in order to assure 
economic sustainability for the country. For instance, this is done in gas and oil sectors 
of large oil and gas producing countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia, Venezuela, etc. 
(Global Investment Center, 2015: 91). 
 
At the same time, biased government policy can be a byproduct of corrupt government 
officials who are influenced by various power groups including criminal ones, who have 
interest in government support of a particular industry. In this situation, political power 
is used to distort competition in the market in favor of industries and companies that 
are sometimes not the most effective. Moreover, corruption-based support of certain 
industries steers attention and resources from other potentially profitable industries, 
preventing efficient resource allocation within the economy. But most importantly, 
government policymaking becomes unpredictable, and long-term planning and invest-
ment within such a political environment is extremely difficult. It becomes increasingly 
unclear which forces will influence government policy and in which direction the policy 
will go, since the policy is not completely guided by the economic interests of the state. 
 
As a reaction to unpredictable and ineffective government policy, international and 
domestic businesses may decide not to invest in the economy where rules of the game 
are unclear. Another option for a business would be to try to influence the government 
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to make decisions favoring this particular business, further spreading corruption and 
ineffective practices throughout the economy. Essentially, economic activities revolve 
not around market-based competition, but around lobbying and sometimes open brib-
ing for preferential government support. 
 
This is only one example out of many, which one could draw from the political factor 
representing the external business environment. Similar cases can be made in relation 
to legal, economic, or social spheres, which influence the business environment. For 
instance, if courts are not independent in a country, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
enforce a contract if a counterpart does not deliver the paid goods. Similarly to the 
previous situation, if the institution does not work properly, business has the option of 
engaging in illegal practices or pulling their investment out of the country. In other 
words, there is always a way of doing business even in countries where there is no 
legal protection of economic agents by the state. However, the more economic agents 
within the economy use other means of achieving economic success besides the legally 
allowed practices, the less effective the economy becomes. In this case, it is no longer 
purely economic competition based on market forces. And when businesses that are 
less economically viable receive more preferences than business having better market 
potential, economic resources are once again being distributed inefficiently. This af-
fects the overall economy and economic practices within the economy as well. 
 
To summarize briefly, one could say that external environment is not so external after 
all. It is something that business faces on a daily basis in the form of rules, habits, laws 
and practices within an economy. Based on these practices, business adjusts its own 
business model so that it addresses the economic reality. When the environment is 
favorable for doing business, companies are investing their resources primarily into 
increasing productivity or creating something new. However, when the environment is 
unfavorable, companies have to invest a lot of time and effort into first overcoming the 
challenges within the external environment before they can think about business relat-
ed activities. 
 
Thus next chapter will look at the Russian economic model and its business climate in 
order to identify how the two influence business and entrepreneurship within the coun-
try.  
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3 Russian economy and business climate 
 
3.1 Russian inheritance  
 
When assessing Russian economic performance and business climate, it is imperative 
to provide several historical references that would allow the reader to see a more holis-
tic picture. History itself, as noted by Allen C. Lynch (2005: 47), in the form of political, 
economic, social, cultural, and other historical influences or legacies, “decisively shapes 
the range of public choice realistically available to leaders and societies.” Therefore, it 
is important to depict some of the major historically determined constraints for Russia’s 
further development. 
 
Medvedev became Russian president and simultaneously announced the creation of 
the innovation-based economy in 2008, immediately following two presidential terms of 
Vladimir Putin. The two presidential terms of Vladimir Putin from 2000 until 2008 can 
be designated as a period of political, economic and social stabilization. It is no secret 
that the vacuum left after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was rapidly 
filled with criminality, humiliation of the least protected social groups, and de facto 
concentration of state power in the hands of influential oligarchic clans. Market mecha-
nisms and public administration were ineffective, while corruption and shadow eco-
nomic activities were pervasive. Russia was experiencing a post-transformational crisis, 
and society learned to live and function anew (Klein, et. al., 2002: 95; Stella, 2003, ch. 
1; 2013, ch. 1).  
 
Therefore, Russian citizens supported the state in its legitimate consolidation of control 
over the country in 2000-2008 after the long-lasting chaos of the 1990s. Tax, budget, 
and public administration reforms were performed with varying success to ensure that 
basic economic activities were executed at a tolerable level. The economy was thriving 
due to a favorable economic environment in the global markets, and particularly due to 
the high oil and gas prices – Russia’s primary export commodities. Relative social and 
economic stability were achieved, as two of the most pressing issues were resolved. 
First, the active part of the military operation in Chechnya came to an end with the 
defeat of terrorists, and terrorist attacks became a rare event in Russian daily life. Se-
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cond, the Russian government was able to lower its foreign debt from 146% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to less than 30% in 2008. This was done since the amount 
paid for debt service in early 2000s was much higher than the actual debt repayment 
(Federal State Statistics Service, 2015).  
 
It seemed that, for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet system, there was 
something comparably large and politically potent to fill in the vacuum left by the Sovi-
et state. However, until 2008, the Russian ruling elite did not have a comprehensive 
long-term socio-economic development plan. Moreover, according to German Gref, 
former minister of economic development, and Alexey Kudrin, former finance minister, 
there were few, if any people within the Russian elite, who understood how to run an 
economy within market realities. Therefore, former president of the World Bank Group 
James Wolfensohn took the unusual step of bringing a group of economic experts to 
Russia, who met Putin and his team numerous times to enlighten them about econom-
ics and economic policies (Gref and Kudrin, 2015). 
 
This fact underlines once again that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a society 
that has no collective memory of living under the free market economy. In addition to 
that, Russia also inherited a highly misbalanced economy oriented on state procure-
ment and military orders. Once the state was taken out of the equation, the economy 
collapsed bringing about extreme poverty and “one of the worst humanitarian catas-
trophes of the twentieth century” (Putin, 2005 cited in Russian International News 
Agency, 2005). The humanitarian catastrophe epitomized in huge loss of population 
and internal migration from East to West, leaving whole cities empty and halting the 
country’s economic activities (Sutela, 2013, ch. 1). After the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, the Rate of Natural Increase of population was negative from 1992 until 2012, and 
ranged from the peak of -960,000 to the lowest of 240,000. In this period, the popula-
tion of Russia decreased by 15 million people, which undoubtedly had a tremendous 
impact on economic growth in Russia until 2013 (Federal State Statistic Service, 2015). 
While another 25 million people, who identified themselves as Russians were locked up 
in the newly established independent states - former Soviet Union members (Putin, 
2005 cited in Russian International News Agency, 2005).  
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There are many other examples of historical developments that have a direct impact 
on Russia’s current economic performance. However, among the major ones already 
mentioned are Soviet heritage in the form of economic structure and mentality, and 
transformational and post-transformational crises in the form of economic stagnation 
and heavy social consequences. Therefore, when looking at the Russian economy, it is 
important to keep in mind that Russia is a very young state with no practical and theo-
retical experience in living within the new realities of a market economy. It is a state 
that bears a heavy burden from the past in basically all spheres of life, and these ac-
cumulated issues of the past are limiting the realistically available choices for future 
development.  
 
3.2 Russia’s economic model 
 
President Medvedev came to power just as the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
was starting to spread from the United States to the emerging markets. Before the 
autumn of 2008, the crisis affected primarily developed countries, but by November, 
the crisis took effect in Russia. Thus, Medvedev’s plan to reform the economy, which 
was based on the assumption that Russia is experiencing stabilization and will see fur-
ther growth in the socio-economic sphere, became obsolete literally at the time it was 
presented. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis has shown that the dynamic economic growth of the 2000s 
was not sustainable and led to accumulation of imbalances in the economy. The 
growth was determined by several factors. First of all, the Russian economy was over-
coming the negative effects of the 1990s transformation on its economy. Some of the 
previously neglected capital and production resources were deployed due to relatively 
long political and economic stability within the country (Mau, Rogov and Yasin, 2013).  
This factor in economics is otherwise known as a low base effect - the tendency of a 
small absolute change from a low initial amount to be translated into a large percent-
age change (Pollmann, 1996). 
 
Secondly, rising earnings from the export of natural resources and considerable inflow 
of borrowed capital contributed to the economic growth of the 2000s. In 2000, Russia 
extracted 327 million tons of crude oil; however, by 2012, Russia was extracting 526 
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million tons of crude oil, which is comparable to the highest levels of oil extraction in 
the Soviet Union in the 1980s (Nabiulina, 2012). According to Nabiulina (2012), then 
minister of economic development, this coincided with oil prices being at their peak 
values. Her main forecast was that no matter how much more oil Russia produces, it 
will not translate into economic growth due to the law of diminishing returns. Addition-
ally, Nabiulina (2012), urged to find other growth drivers, since the boom cycle for oil 
prices was coming to an end, while shale oil and gas presented a credible threat for 
conventional producers of oil and gas. Nevertheless, while the Russian economy was 
booming due to the high raw material prices, investment in the economy presented a 
good risk/reward ratio, which attracted hot capital and simultaneously maintained a 
high level of liquidity within the economy.  
 
Lastly, real income in the given period grew by some 11% every year, which was al-
most two times faster than growth of production (Mau, Rogov and Yasin, 2013). As a 
result of this imbalance, domestic demand was twice larger than domestic supply. This 
situation led to high inflation rates well above 10% and extending imports that pre-
dominantly covered domestic demand. As consumerism spurred economic growth with-
in the country, Russian citizens were enjoying a diversity of goods and services for the 
first time since goods and food shortages started in Soviet Union in 1987. The con-
sumer market saw a tsunami of domestic appliances and cars of sufficient quality from 
all over the world at a decent price. In order to somehow restrain influx of highly com-
petitive foreign goods and to protect domestic producers, the Russian Government had 
to rely on continuous waves of currency devaluation (Nabiulina, 2012). 
 
Collapse of commodity prices and the overall slowdown of the global economy in 2008 
led to the return of excess capital from Russia to developed markets, while rapid con-
traction of income and domestic demand brought down the economy and its financial 
market. Throughout the course of the 2008-2009 crisis, the Russian economy demon-
strated record contraction of GDP among large economies — approximately 8% (Mau, 
Rogov and Yasin, 2013). 
 
The crisis revealed the heavy reliance of the Russian economy on foreign capital mar-
kets and overall global economic conjuncture. Simultaneously, consumption-based 
economic growth was fueled by rising consumer crediting as the reemerging middle 
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class that was established in Russia after several years of relative stability was willing 
to take loans, believing in the soundness of the Russian economic system. Thus, the 
GFC brought the absolutely irrational consumer paradise as well as the soft credit con-
straints for Russian state-owned monopolies to an end. 
 
By many accounts (Ministry of Economic Development, 2008; Nabiulina, 2012; Mau, 
Rogov and Yasin, 2013), this kind of extensive growth in light of other structural prob-
lems of the economy such as weakness of institutions and poor business environment 
would have come to a halt rather soon even without the GFC. The extensive growth of 
the 2000s had nothing in common with building a stable innovation-based economy, 
whereas structural problems that had been neglected or unnoticed due to high growth 
rates remained unresolved, and kept accumulating. 
 
If the above-mentioned growth factors are symptoms of an unsustainable extensive 
growth model, do these factors allow for a transition of Russian economy to a more 
sustainable innovation-based growth model? The answer is a conditional yes. In 2009, 
85% of all Russian exports accounted for commodities with no value added. Value-add 
is an extra process, which a company applies to a product that makes it worth more 
than the cost of its underlying parts (Investopedia, n.d.). For example, oil and gas 
companies in Russia are primarily concerned with extraction and transportation of 
crude oil and natural gas. According to Thomson Reuters Kortes, the average cost of 
one ton of crude oil as of August 2015 was US$242 (Razumovskii, 2015). Instead of 
exporting the raw commodity, one could refine crude oil and get out of it diesel fuel, 
fuel oil, kerosene, etc. The total value of products extracted from one ton of crude oil 
would be equal to US$343, which is some 42% of added value (ibid.). In addition to 
that, developing refining capability would create extra workplaces, finance research 
and development, the development of human capital, and possibly create a spillover 
effect into other industries. 
 
So, why this does not happen in Russia or happens at a relatively low pace? A simple 
answer would be that there is no trust in the Russian economy. Both domestic and 
foreign investors see way too many risks and barriers to doing business with Russia. In 
short, the business environment in Russia is not favorable for doing business, and 
companies are either facing challenges in establishing new production or extremely 
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uncertain about business prospects in the country. In fact, it is also widely believed 
that lacking institutions and barriers to doing business did not allow Russia to translate 
the extra-ordinary incomes of the 2000s into a solid foundation for a future innovation-
based economy (Åslund, 2009). Therefore, one could conclude that both from theoreti-
cal point of view mentioned in chapter two, and Russia’s practical experience, building 
an innovation-based economy without a favorable environment is deemed to be im-
possible. The following sub-chapter will be dealing with some day-to-day problems that 
Russian business and society experiences, which altogether mirror the quality of Rus-
sia’s business environment.  
 
3.3 Russia’s business environment 
 
3.3.1 Doing Business Report perspective 
 
One way to identify challenges that business faces in Russia is to look at the Doing 
Business Report produced by the World Bank on a yearly basis. This study reflects ease 
of doing business or favorability of the business environment across 189 countries. The 
index for each country is an average of ten indicators such as starting a business, ob-
taining electricity, trading across borders, dealing with construction permits, etc. For a 
better visual representation, see Table 1 on the next page. For the period from 2006 
until 2013, Russia’s best rank was 92nd and worst was 124th. If this is an average of ten 
indicators for some indexes, Russia should be ranked even lower than 124th (World 
Bank, 2013). 
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Table 1. Doing business in Russia - 2013. Source: World Bank 2013. 
 
Thus, a closer look at the 2013 edition of the Doing Business Report reveals that, for 
example, in dealing with construction permits, Russia is ranked 178th — close to Tajiki-
stan, Albania, and Azerbaijan. Such low ranking can be partly explained by the number 
Doing business in Russian Federation 2013 
Ease of doing busi-
ness (rank) 112 
GNI per capita ($US) 
10,400 
Population (m) 141.9 
Starting a business 
(rank)……………….101 
Procedures (num-
ber)..……………..…….8 
Time (days).….......18 
Registering property 
(rank)………………………..46 
Procedures (number)…….5 
Time (days)…………..……44 
Trading across borders 
(rank).............................162 
Documents to export (num-
ber)….................................8 
Time to export (days).…….21 
Documents to import (num-
ber)...…………………………….11 
Time to import (days)………36 
Getting construction 
permits (rank)….178 
Procedures (num-
ber)…................…42 
Time (days)….…..344 
Getting credit (rank)….104 
Strength of legal rights (0-
10)………………………….…3 
 
Enforcing contracts (rank)…11 
Procedures (number)………..36 
Time (days)…………..……….270 
 
Getting electricity 
(rank)……………….184 
Procedures (num-
ber)…………………….10 
Time (days).........281 
Protecting investors 
(rank)……………………..117 
Investor protection (0-
10)………………………….4.7 
Resolving insolvency (rank).53 
Time (years)…………………...2.0 
 Paying taxes (rank)…….64 
Payments (number per 
year)………………….………..7 
Time (hours per year)...177 
Total tax rate (%)……..54.1 
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of procedures a business would have to undergo in order to receive a construction 
permit from officials. The number is equal to 42 procedures and it is the highest num-
ber of procedures among all countries in the study. 
 
Furthermore, it may take a business in Russia up to 281 days to get an electricity con-
nection, which puts the country second to last for this indicator, at 185th place. For 
trading across borders, Russia is ranked at number 162. Overall score for the year 
2013 is 112, and it is achieved mostly due to the relative ease of enforcing contracts 
(11th) and registering property (46th). However, the results should be taken with cau-
tion, since the study assessed only the largest city in a country. In the case of Russia, 
only Moscow has been studied for ease of doing business, whereas when going farther 
east of Moscow, the results could be very different. For example, it can be even more 
difficult to get an electricity connection due to the lack of infrastructure, but easier to 
get a construction permit. 
 
Some may think that indexes offered by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report can 
be prone to political bias, and ratings for some countries can be purposely lowered. But 
when looking at the yearly survey about Russia’s business environment compiled by 
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), one can see that the 
World Bank’s assessments are in fact very moderate. This can be partially explained by 
different methodological approaches in surveying business between RUIE and the 
World Bank, since the RUIE runs its survey throughout the country, unlike the World 
Bank. 
 
Thus according to the World Bank, starting a business in Russia might take up to 18 
days, whereas according to the RUIE, in only 39% of cases one can start a business in 
the same period of time. According to RUIE, in 61% of cases, starting a business in 
Russia takes from 19 to more than 90 days (RUIE, 2014). In 2013, 59% of Russian 
business representatives said that it was extremely difficult to start a business in their 
region, which is 7% growth since 2010 (ibid.).  
 
Similar to the Doing Business Report, the survey run by the RUIE identified lack of af-
fordable credit despite the key interest rate set by the Central Bank at 5.5% in 2013, 
40% of respondents claimed that in reality they pay more than 15% a year in interest. 
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At the same time, 30% of respondents paid 10-12% in interest payments for their 
loans (RUIE, 2014). 
 
There is only one instance in which the World Bank report offers worse estimations of 
the Russian economy than the RUIE. The World Bank claims that the fiscal burden on 
Russian firms is equal to 51%, while the RUIE claim that this indicator for Russia is at 
31% 
 
It can be argued that the overall picture presented by the Russian Union of industrial-
ists and Entrepreneurs is very similar to the one offered by the World Bank. Simultane-
ously, it can be assumed that the RUIE has closer contacts to business in regions, and 
thus more realistic information about country as a whole.  
 
Minor differences in assessments do not suggest that from either point of view, the 
Russian business environment is favorable for doing business. It is no wonder that 
commodity producers and state monopolies invest unwillingly even into related indus-
tries, not to mention innovative sectors of the economy. There are way too many bar-
riers to entry and to doing business in Russia. That is why the state in Russia works as 
a huge redistribution machine that takes profits from rather effective raw material ex-
porters and allocates them in unprofitable and ineffective sectors of the economy. Oth-
erwise, no sensible manager or entrepreneur would be willing to invest so much time 
and money in launching a new industry. And as the ongoing currency crisis of 2015 will 
show, – it is much more profitable — and easy — for large companies to invest their 
extra export profits in financial instruments and foreign exchange trade than into real 
sectors of the economy. In other words, betting with taxpayers’ money will be more 
secure than investing in a business undertaking in Russia. 
 
Although the Doing Business report is a good starting point to understand the business 
environment in a country, the list of indicators offered in the report is by no means 
exhaustive. Managers and entrepreneurs take into consideration a much wider spec-
trum of possible challenges existing in an economy. A more in-depth overview of busi-
ness climate in a country is presented in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is-
sued by the World Economic Forum (WEF), a Swiss non-governmental organization 
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famous for its yearly meetings in Davos. Thus next sub-subchapter will be dealing with 
the Global Competitiveness Report. 
 
3.3.2 Global Competitiveness Report perspective 
 
The GCR is a very comprehensive study of the economic competitiveness of a country, 
which scrutinizes twelve pillars (indexes) of competitiveness. For a better visual repre-
sentation, see Table 2 on the next page.  The first four pillars represent indicators that 
are seen as basic requirements for building a competitive economy. These are ‘quality 
of institutions’, ‘infrastructure’, ‘macroeconomic stability’ and ‘health and primary edu-
cation’. The next six pillars are called efficiency enhancers, and hence deal with such 
indexes as ‘technological readiness’, ‘financial market development’, ‘labor market effi-
ciency’, and so on. Successful performance for these indicators is a sign of an economy 
that is ready to transform into a competitive innovation-led economy. Last two pillars 
refer to the level of innovative orientation of an economy. The final two indexes look at 
‘domestic business sophistication’ (competitiveness) and ‘innovative potential’. Further, 
each of the pillars is divided into sub-indicators, for example, quality of institutions is 
an index of 22 sub-indicators like ‘property rights’, ‘public trust in politicians’, ‘orga-
nized crime’, etc.  
 
In the 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness Report, Russia was ranked as number 67 
with a clear downward trend (in 2011-2012 – 66, 2010-2011 – 63). This is the worst 
competitiveness indicator among the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa). Due to the aim of building an innovation-based economy in Russia, the 
last two indicators of the report – ‘business sophistication’ and ‘innovative potential’ are 
of particular interest for this work. For these two indicators, Russia is ranked 119th and 
85th, respectively. Calculation of business sophistication or competitiveness is based on 
nine sub-indicators, and for all of them, Russia scores in the second hundred closer to 
the end of the list. Similarly, innovative potential of the economy that is still being 
praised as a possible growth driver is in a dire situation. For availability of scientists 
and engineers, Russia is 90th in the GCR, for university-industry collaboration in R&D – 
85th, and for company spending on R&D – 79th.  
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Russian Global Competitiveness Index 2013 
Sub-indexes 
 
 
Examples of indicators (rank) 
Corresponding 
type of econ-
omy 
Basic requirements….........53 
Institutions…………..………..…..133 
Infrastructure…………..……..……47 
Macroeconomic environment.…22  
Health and primary education..65  
 
Property rights…….………….….133 
Quality of roads..………..........136 
Inflation, annual % change….111  
Life expectancy, years……......100 
 
Key for  
factor-
driven  
economy 
Efficiency enhancers..….....54 
Higher education and training..52 
Goods market efficiency…..….134 
Labor market efficiency………...84 
Financial market development..65 
Technological readiness.......... 57 
Market size ..............................7 
 
Quality of educational system..86 
Intensity of local competition.124 
Cooperation in labor-employer rela-
tions..................................125 
Soundness of banks .............132 
Avail. of latest technologies….129 
Domestic market size.…….………9 
 
Key for 
efficiency-
driven 
economy 
Innovation and sophistica-
tion factors…….…………..108 
Business sophistication……....119 
Innovation potential................85 
 
 
Nature of competitive ad-
vantage…............................125 
Government procurement of ad-
vanced technological prod-
ucts........…………………….….124 
 
Key for 
innovation-
driven 
economy 
 
Table 2. Russian Global Competitiveness Index - 2013. Source: World Economic Forum 
2013. 
 
The position of the Russian economy in terms of its innovative component can be de-
scribed as catastrophic. The way Russian companies do business, their competitive 
advantages, and managerial and marketing techniques, are outdated, and belong to 
the practices of the developing countries. Simultaneously, the illusion that some 25 
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still has high innovative potential 
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represents populist and wishful thinking. Russian science has been underfinanced for 
decades, and has lost connections with industries and the real economy, while humili-
atingly small salaries forced a massive ‘brain drain’ to the West and to service indus-
tries (Sutela, 2013, ch. 1). Without serious innovation in business practices and refor-
mation of science, massive investments and most importantly – time, Russia cannot be 
considered to be a serious innovation-led economy.  
 
At the same time, in a modern economy, the number of factors determining economic 
and competitive dynamics is growing exponentially. Certainly there are other factors 
that determine Russian competitiveness, and they are intertwined in a complex system 
of relations influencing each other positively or negatively.  
 
Unfortunately in case of Russia, different competitiveness factors influence each other 
negatively, thus creating a kind of self-reinforcing vicious circle. Therefore, when look-
ing at other indicators of the GCR, one can see that bad institutions (Russia is 133rd), 
financial market underdevelopment (130th place), and quality of management schools 
(115th place) are inevitably influencing the way business in Russia is done. If market 
institutions do not work well enough, economic agents would have to find other ways 
to gain and redistribute profit. Hence a staggering 21% of respondents claimed that 
corruption is the most problematic factor for doing business, and second is inefficient 
government bureaucracy  — 11% (GCR, 2013).   
 
As with the Doing Business Report, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepre-
neurs runs a survey that is somewhat similar to the Global Competitiveness Report. 
However, in the case with the GCR, there are large methodological differences, since 
the RUIE assesses only the Russian economy and offers results to for each question in 
as a percentage of all respondents, who answered the question.  In other words, all 
questions do not add up to 100%. This survey looks into the most pressing issues dis-
turbing entrepreneurial activities in Russia each year. See Figure 1 on the next page. 
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Figure 1. Most pressing issues disturbing entrepreneurial activities in Russia. Source: 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 2014. 
 
The survey shows a positive trend among the most pressing issues for doing business 
in Russia when comparing data from 2010 until 2013. However, the five most pressing 
issues are still mentioned as an impediment for doing business by more than one third 
of respondents. Each of these five issues translates into ineffective practices of doing 
business, and thus making the economy itself ineffective. More than half of respond-
ents claimed that the most pressing issue for them is to find a qualified workforce 
(RUIE, 2014). This means that business essentially does not have human resources of 
sufficient quality to realize their day-to-day objectives, not to mention investment into 
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innovative sectors of the economy. There are simply not enough people in Russia with 
sufficiently good training and skills to pull the country out of dependence on commodi-
ty trade. This confirms the relatively low ratings in the Global Competitiveness Report 
for the quality of the education system (86th) and the extent of staff training (89th) 
(WEF, 2013). 
 
Simultaneously, business’s criticism of inflation and excessive fiscal burden mirror Rus-
sia’s unsustainable economic model, which is not suitable for long-term investments. 
Fluctuations in prices, often changes in tax and budget policies make the rules in the 
Russian market unpredictable. Frequent changes in the government regulation do not 
allow business to stabilize and thus business has to invest additional resources in com-
plying with new norms and regulations. However, in most of the case with good con-
nections it is easier to go around the new regulations by corrupting the officials, which 
makes corruption fourth most, pressing issue for doing business in Russia (RUIE, 
2014). 
 
3.3.3 Business environment what should be done? 
 
Regardless of the methodological differences between the three reports there are no 
grounds to assume that one of the reports is more biased than the other. Scrutinizing 
the Russian economy from different perspectives, the reports come to very similar con-
clusions – the Russian economy and society are in urgent need of reforms. Russian 
economic growth is absolutely unsustainable, whereas conditions for its improvement 
are essentially non-existent. Bad practices essentially reinforce each other making 
change within the socio-economic sphere barely possible. 
 
The pompous growth of the early 2000s was possible at the cost of creating imbalanc-
es due to high oil prices, fueling consumer crediting and the effect of the low base, and 
now results in diminishing returns. The Global Financial Crisis revealed that the struc-
ture of the economy and business practices in Russia are far less effective than those 
in the developed capitalist economies.  
 
There are rapidly degrading competitive advantages in the form of the Soviet economic 
heritage. Depreciation of capital assets in Russia is equal to 50% (in some industries 
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up to 80%), whereas average for the BRICS countries is 35%, Germany - 16%. But 
above all, the society itself is not ready and is not able to produce a considerable 
change in the way institutions and businesses in Russia work. Out of 143.5 million 
people who lived in Russia in 2013, only 24.5 million did not live during the Soviet Un-
ion and traumatic 1990s. For the rest of the 119 million people, concepts such as good 
business practices, property rights, inflation, and government transparency are alien 
concepts. None of them existed during the Soviet period, whereas in the chaos of 
1990s, the concepts were simply inapplicable to the economic situation within the 
country. 
 
It is not surprising that all three reports unanimously assert that the business climate 
in Russia, as it is understood by the developed capitalist economies, is extremely unfa-
vorable for doing business. But can the Russian government do anything to turn the 
situation around? This question is beyond the scope of this work, but nevertheless it is 
important to recapitulate some of the policies that could potentially improve the situa-
tion with the Russian business climate. 
 
Before looking at particular measures, it is worth mentioning that any economic pro-
gram cannot be unsystematic, and it should encompass a wide range of issues, includ-
ing monetary and budget policies, private property practices, manager-employee rela-
tions, etc. All the variables can be adjusted in various ways to provide initiatives and 
improve conditions of different social groups and industries with a purpose of getting a 
certain positive outcome (Glaziev, 2015). In other words, new socio-economic policy 
would require redistribution of wealth, initiatives and, probably, influence throughout 
the economy. 
 
However, Russian oligarchs and the ruling elite are not interested in such a change, 
because it would mean that they would have to lose their privileged position within the 
socio-economic structure of Russia. So by some accounts, positive change is also im-
possible due to the ruling elites doing everything to maintain the status quo (Khazin, 
2015). Developing an innovation-based economy would mean steering some of the 
resources from Russian traditional export industries to innovative sectors of the econ-
omy. 
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But even if the Russian elite would suddenly realize that the country needs to be re-
formed and that it is in their best interest for the economy to prosper, where should 
one start the reformation process?  
 
The head of the Institute for Industrial Production of the Russian Academy of Science, 
Alexeev Alexey (2014: 369), calculated a correlation coefficient of each of the pillars of 
the Global Competitiveness Report to GDP per capita. Out of twelve pillars of competi-
tiveness, seven should have a particularly high correlation with GDP per capita. These 
are: quality of institutes, infrastructure, higher education and training, goods market 
efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovative potential.  
 
Then, by creating a diagonal matrix of paired correlations (each pillar with each pillar) 
he found the strongest links between the competitiveness pillars. Thus, quality of insti-
tutes is strongly connected with the market of goods and services. A bit weaker link is 
between quality of institutions and business sophistication and innovative potential of 
business. Infrastructure and higher education and training are closely related to the 
level of technological readiness, sophistication and innovative potential of business 
(Alexeev, 2014: 371). 
 
Then Alexeev (2014: 372), suggests following the logic offered in the Global Competi-
tiveness Report 2012-2013, which goes as follows: 
 
While we report the results of the 12 pillars of competitiveness separately, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that they are not independent: they tend to reinforce each 
other, and a weakness in one area often has a negative impact in others. For exam-
ple, a strong innovation capacity (pillar 12) will be very difficult to achieve without a 
healthy, well-educated and trained workforce (pillars 4 and 5) that is adept at absorb-
ing new technologies (pillar 9), and without sufficient financing (pillar 8) for R&D or 
an efficient goods market that makes it possible to take new innovations to market 
(pillar 6). 
 
So, using the same logic it will be reasonable to assume that institute determine effi-
ciency of the goods and services market not vice versa. Indeed, if a market has incon-
sistent and unclear rules of the game it is difficult to expect that market for goods and 
services will be functioning as efficiently as it does in the countries with more adequate 
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institutes. However, it is also true that development of the goods and services market 
require consequent change in the institutional framework. Nevertheless, development 
of markets will not go far without sufficient institutional framework, which is why insti-
tutions should be developed first and only then the goods and services market (Alexe-
ev, 2014: 372). 
 
The same logic applies to the chain ‘infrastructure – higher education and training – 
level of technological readiness’. First, one should establish developed infrastructure 
and sophisticated quality of education and only then corresponding level of technologi-
cal development will emerge. 
 
Thus according to Alexeev (2014: 372), institutions, infrastructure, higher education, 
and training are the core issues and the first to be addressed if one wants to create a 
competitive and innovation-based economy. At a later stage, successful resolution of 
issues related to the goods market and level of technological readiness must be ad-
dressed. Lastly, level of innovative potential and sophistication of business will result 
from the way previous issues have been solved.  
 
Even without Alexeev’s analysis, Russia has seen numerous periods in its history with-
out a clear institutional framework. This happened in 1917 after the revolution and 
again in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Klein, et. al., 2002: 67). Therefore 
understanding within the Russian elite that it is impossible to build any kind of econo-
my without creating an institutional framework should exist on the level of collective 
memory. And if there is no such understanding, it says something about the quality of 
the current Russian elite.  
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4 Conclusion  
 
The goal of this work was to assess whether or not Russian socio-economic conditions 
as of 2013 allowed for creation of an innovation-based economy. The thesis estab-
lished that an innovation-based economy is a type of economy whose primary factors 
of growth are entrepreneurship and innovation. This type of economy creates goods 
and services that require a high level of advanced technology and managerial 
knowhow. Simultaneously, by deploying advanced technologies and managerial exper-
tise, entrepreneurs create new technologies and managerial practices, thus reinforcing 
the growth cycle.  
 
However, the existence and success of entrepreneurship and innovations do not occur 
in a vacuum, and depend on the external business environment of a country. Hereof 
the goal of an economic policy within a country is to create conditions for smooth and 
barrier-free operation of businesses within a clearly defined legal framework. This 
framework essentially rests among others on political, economic and social stability. 
Thus transparency and stability of the business’s external environment would theoreti-
cally allow entrepreneurs to concentrate on the creation and realization of innovations 
within the economy.  
 
The thesis has revealed that this is not true for the Russian business climate. Starting 
with the basics, it was established that the current economic model is not sustainable 
and is not suitable for long-term investment. Since business does not believe in longev-
ity of the Russian economy, it is mostly speculative in its essence, hence the business 
is not interested in improving the quality of the environment. The goal of the specula-
tive capital is to reap the benefits and exit with profits. 
 
The rapid economic growth of the 2000s was determined primarily by three factors: 
favorable economic conjuncture on global markets, consumption- and credit-fuelled 
growth, and the low base effect. None of these factors was directly controlled by Rus-
sia; on the contrary, the factors simply coincided with the period of relative stability in 
Russia itself. When the situation with global markets turned negative in 2008, Russian 
economic growth changed accordingly. 
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Simultaneously, domestic and foreign business in Russia has to take into account vari-
ous risks directly unrelated to business operations and economic environment. These 
risks permeate all spheres of doing business in the country as established by the Doing 
Business Report, the Global Competitiveness Report, and the Russian Union of Indus-
trialists and Entrepreneurs surveys. To mention a few, corruption, inefficient govern-
ment bureaucracy, inadequately educated workforce, and poor infrastructure are sig-
nificant factors in the business equation. Legal business in Russia is being squeezed 
from all possible sides by the negative factors of the external environment. The busi-
ness spends a lot of time and efforts to overcome the challenges of the unfavorable 
business environment instead of concentrating on business related activities. 
 
Within such a business environment, it is deemed impossible to develop any kind of 
business, not to mention an innovation oriented one. It can be argued that Medvedev’s 
four I’s - institutions, infrastructure, investment and innovation are mentioned in the 
right order. First, Russia should create conditions for doing business in the country in 
the form of transparent and effective institutions and good infrastructure, and only 
then invest money into innovative growth drivers. Otherwise, this investment will not 
produce the desired result, and will be simply wasted. 
 
Setting such a high standard for building an innovation-based economy only 18 years 
after the traumatic collapse of the Soviet Union seems a very formidable task in light of 
already established facts about the Russian society and economy. It would be reason-
able to first refresh current industrial and research potential before investing time and 
effort into development of disciplines and industries about which Russian society has 
only theoretical knowledge. 
 
Developing institutions and infrastructure should be an absolute priority, but it might 
take a long time before one sees the first signs of well-functioning market institutions 
in Russia. Perhaps it will not happen under the current government, nor under the cur-
rent president, but it is an obligation of the current elite to sow the seeds for future 
institutional development.  
 
Russian Prime Minister under Nicholas II, Pyotr Stolypin (1907 as quoted in Sput-
niknews, 2012) said: “… give Russia 20 years of inner and outer peace and you won’t 
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recognize it.” History has taught Russia that there will never be 20 years of stability, 
and hence Russia is destined for uneven and sporadic economic growth in the upcom-
ing turbulent decades. There are simply too many things that need to be fixed. 
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